J. Safra Sarasin
Cross-Asset Weekly

10 May 2024

Both Trump and Biden will address China competition

There is bipartisan support in the US to address the US-China strategic competition, though with different approaches. Trump's proposal is unilateral, blunter and more broad-based, while Biden wants to put a "high fence around a yard" of key technologies with the support from partners around the world. Unilateral tariffs run the risk of imposing lower economic growth, but could increase reshoring in the US. Lower growth prospects as a result of tariffs could hit equity markets around the world. Biden's approach will not result in an immediate macro impact, but would lower global productivity in the long run.

Since the start of the year, US markets have repriced up short-term policy rate expectations. But they have also substantially marked up the estimated level of the equilibrium rate of interest, to above 4.5%, as the US economy proved much more resilient to higher rates than expected. The level of long-run neutral rate is the most important driver for long-term yields. That said, a negative reaction of risk assets to the higher rates or signs of a more meaningful slowdown in US growth could easily see lower neutral rate expectations again and hence a sharp fall in bond yields, as happened at the end of last year.

We see scope for euro area small caps to outperform their large cap peers after two years of underperformance. Cyclical data has turned in favour of small caps and valuation discounts have risen to record highs. A catalyst for small caps to outperform would be a more dovish repricing of euro area rates, which we think is more likely than a renewed sharp pick up in rates in the near term.

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Contacts

Dr. Karsten Junius, CFA
Chief Economist
karsten.junius@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 32 79

Raphael Olszyna-Marzys
International Economist
raphael.olszyna-marzys@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 32 69

Mali Chivakul
Emerging Markets Economist
mali.chivakul@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 33 01

Alex Rohner
Fixed Income Strategist
alex.rohner@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 32 24

Dr. Claudio Wewel
FX Strategist
claudio.wewel@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 32 26

Wolf von Rotberg
Equity Strategist
wolf.vonrotberg@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 30 20

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US-China tensions

Trump's tariffs vs Biden's "larger yard"

Mali Chivakul
Emerging Markets Economist
mali.chivakul@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 33 01

There is bipartisan support in the US to address the US-China strategic competition. Both presidential candidates will likely continue to escalate the tensions but their approaches are different. Trump's proposal is unilateral, blunter and more broad-based. He prioritises addressing the hollowing out of American manufacturing. Biden, on the other hand, puts a "high fence around a yard" of key technologies. He also enlists support from partners around the world and leans towards addressing the national security concerns. In our view, Trump will likely threaten China with 60% tariffs to get a deal on fentanyl controls as his campaign has also prioritised the war on drugs. Still, 60% tariffs would dramatically reduce US-China trade and significantly hurt both countries. Cumulative US GDP losses could be almost 2 trillion US dollar over 5 years. A 10% universal tariff would deliver lower imports, exports and investment, higher prices and a US dollar appreciation, but could increase reshoring in the US. Lower growth prospects as a result of the tariffs would hit equity markets around the world. Biden's "larger yard" will not result in an immediate macro impact, but would lower global productivity in the long run.

There is bipartisan support to address the strategic competition with China

The election in the US in November could bring about policy changes which could impact the rest of the world. In this piece, we focus on the economic implications of the two presidential candidates' likely policy paths with regard to the US-China strategic competition. It has become one of the most important election issues since Trump's win in 2016 and there has been bipartisan support since. The American public's view of China has deteriorated over time, with the latest Gallup poll showing 77% unfavourable of China, compared to 50% in 2016.

Both presidential candidates will likely continue to escalate tensions, but their approaches are different

Both candidates see China's industrial policy as unfair and damaging to American workers and agree that it has hollowed out American manufacturing (see the first set of quotes in Exhibit 1). Both are also concerned about China's national security threat. Still, their policy strategies are different (the second set of quotes in Exhibit 1). Trump's proposal is unilateral, blunter and more broad-based because he emphasises addressing the "hollowing out of American manufacturing" in his campaign. Biden instead targets a (growing) list of technologies and enlists support from partners around the world as he leans more towards addressing the national security concerns.

Exhibit 1: Trump and Biden agree on the unfairness of China's industrial policy and seek to address it

Trump in Pennsylvania, June 2016	Biden in Pennsylvania, April 2024
"China's unfair subsidy behaviour is prohibited by the terms of its entrance to the WTO and I intend to enforce those rules and regulations. I will use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes, including the application of tariffs... We will stand up to trade cheating. Cheating. Cheaters, that's what they are. Cheaters. We will stand up to trade cheating anywhere and everywhere it threatens the American job."	"Because Chinese steel companies produce a lot more steel than China needs, it ends up dumping the extra steel into the global markets at unfairly low prices. And the prices are unfairly low because Chinese steel companies don't need to worry about making a profit, because the Chinese government is subsidizing them so heavily. They're not competing. They're cheating. They're cheating. And we've seen the damage here in America."
Trump on CNBC, March 2024	**Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership, April 2023**
"I'm a big believer in tariffs. I fully believe in them economically when you're being taken advantage of by other countries. The whole topic of tariffs to me is so simple. Number one, it's great economically for us and it brings our companies back because if you charge tariffs to China, they're going to build their car plans here and they're going to employ our people. If you want to sell a car in China, you can't okay, you pay a massive tax or massive tariff. If we make our cars, we can't sell in China, they charge tremendous tariffs. Well, they're very smart. They're saying, come over to this country. They're right now building big plants because of Biden. So they build a big giant of plants in Mexico then they sell it across the border with very little tax. It's ridiculous. We want them to build their plans in the United States. We don't want to get cars from China. We want to get cars made by China in the United States using our workers but it also gives us a big political power. When a country just rips us off like China then what I did is that the tariffs and the tariffs were forcing companies back to the United States."	"The United States, under President Biden, is pursuing a modern industrial and innovation strategy—both at home and with partners around the world. The People's Republic of China continued to subsidize at a massive scale both traditional industrial sectors, like steel, as well as key industries of the future, like clean energy, digital infrastructure, and advanced biotechnologies. Clean-energy supply chains are at risk of being weaponized in the same way as oil in the 1970s, or natural gas in Europe in 2022. America now manufactures only around 10 percent of the world's semiconductors, and production—in general and especially when it comes to the most advanced chips—is geographically concentrated elsewhere. This creates a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability. We've implemented carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China. Those restrictions are premised on straightforward national security concerns. A word on China more broadly. As President von der Leyen put it recently, we are for de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling. We are protecting our foundational technologies with a small yard and high fence."

Source: Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Trump's "America First" strategy: Unilateral decoupling from China and tariffs for the rest of the world

During his presidency, Trump relied on tariffs on a broad set of goods and a trade deal (Phase I deal with China) with an objective to correct the size of the bilateral trade deficits. In his latest campaign, he has pledged for a "pro-American trade to end our reliance on China" via higher tariffs. His reasoning is simple—he would like to see companies (Chinese or American) investing in the US instead of elsewhere. He has also suggested that he would revoke China's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status, implying that China will be relegated to a group of countries that are subject to higher tariffs (existing group members are North Korea, Cuba, Russia and Belarus). Without a PNTR status, Chinese goods would face up to 60% tariffs. He would additionally ban Chinese imports with a proposal for a four-year plan to phase out all Chinese imports of essential goods ("electronics to steel to pharmaceuticals"). This would effectively be a decoupling from China. He has also been vocal about setting a 10% tariff on all imported goods.

Biden: De-risking and diversifying but not decoupling

When Biden came to power, he did not scrap Trump's tariffs but went beyond general tariffs to target specific industries with "critical economic risks." He did not try to enforce the Phase I deal to get China to buy more American goods and reduce trade deficits. Instead, Biden's strategy, as Jake Sullivan, his National Security Adviser said it clearly last year, is to de-risk and pursue industrial policy for the sectors that are deemed important on national security grounds. Key industries such as clean energy, digital infrastructure and advanced biotechnologies need to be protected and scaled up at home and with partners around the world. His IRA and CHIPS Acts are parts of the strategy. He has also limited US outbound investment in certain tech sectors in China and introduced national security priorities for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS). His actions, unlike Trump's, are not unilateral. His export controls on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China is a good example of the US working with partners as he has also convinced Japan and the Netherlands to implement the policy.

Biden's "a small yard and high fence" strategy has built on Trump's legacy

Trump's goal of economic security as national security was not as well broadcasted as his trade war. But it was during his term that the Export Control Reform Act became law, and the criteria for "emerging and foundational technologies" were first proposed. The information and communications technology and services (ICTS) supply chain restrictions were also established during Trump's period. Biden's strategy of building "a small yard and high fence" in semiconductor technology has built on Trump's legacy by effectively expanding affected Chinese entities (to any Chinese importer) and broadening the controls to the whole supply chain.

Trump's investment decoupling from China would encompass more sectors and companies, but Biden will likely expand his "yard", too

Currently, Trump's security concerns encompass broader sectors than what Biden has targeted. Donald Trump has discussed stopping American companies from investing in China and only allowing Chinese investment that clearly serves American interests. Chinese ownership in energy, technology, telecommunications and natural resources should be wound down as they are important for national security. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has already started expanding the "yard" to include items related to cloud computing and certain data flows.

China has so far proved to be a popular election topic

As the elections heat up, both candidates have ramped up their rhetoric on China. Biden has resorted to "defend US workers" by tripling the existing tariff rate on Chinese steel and aluminium and starting an investigation in the maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors. Steel and aluminium tariffs were first introduced during Trump's years, and have already limited Chinese imports to the US. Tripling steel tariffs would have minimal effects on both China and the US.

Trump's tariffs in 2018/19 have had a strong dampening effect on imports

What economic implications should we expect from these promises? Let's start with Trump's. Before discussing Trump's new tariff proposals, it is useful to summarise the

effects of the 2018/19 tariffs. There are two groups of goods that are subject to tariffs: The first one (List 1, 2, 3) is subject to a 25% tariff and includes mostly intermediate inputs and capital equipment such as IT hardware, semiconductors, and auto parts. The second one (List 4A) is subject to a 7.5% tariff (reduced in 2020 from 15% in 2019) and includes items such as lithium batteries, clothing and footwear. The third group is not subject to any tariff and includes items such as phones, laptops and toys. The groups that are subject to tariffs have clearly suffered with trade diversions taking place as the US has imported more from the rest of the world (see here and Exhibit 2). The share of Chinese imports in US total imports has dropped (Exhibit 3, although China's share may be too low due to significant small-sized imports that are not paying tariffs and are not captured in the data). Countries that have benefited include Mexico and ASEAN countries. China's retaliation via import tariffs on American agricultural products (such as soybeans) has benefited Brazil.

Exhibit 2: Trump's 2018 tariffs have dampened Chinese imports and created trade diversion



Source: PIIE, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Trump's 60% tariff could first be used as a threat, and China could offer a deal on fentanyl control

In our view, revoking the PNTR status which is equivalent to imposing 60% tariffs on China will likely be used first as a threat. China has an upper hand on fentanyl control, which is another campaign priority for Trump. He had used this tactic in 2019. It is possible that a deal could be reached to keep China on the PNTR list while China agrees to a firmer cooperation on fentanyl.

Outsized tariffs, essentially a decoupling, would depress outputs in both China and the US

A 60% tariff and/or import ban would clearly be a blow to China. While China has been diversifying its export destinations, the US is still an important market especially for those goods that have escaped 2018 tariffs. Increases in tariffs and trade policy uncertainty would also have negative consequences for the US economy. Empirical literature (such as this paper) suggests that US importers mostly bore the cost of US tariffs from 2018/19 by paying for higher prices. In general, import tariffs persistently depress imports, exports, and domestic investment, especially with retaliation from China. Near-term inflation would increase. The trade balance can improve, but comes at the cost of a domestic demand compression.

60% tariffs could cause a US GDP loss of almost 2 trillion US dollar and job losses of 800,000

The US-China Business Council together with Oxford Economics estimated that a repeal of the PNTR status and retaliation from China could cost the US a cumulative GDP loss of almost 2 trillion US dollar over 5 years. Job losses could reach 800,000. Initially, inflation would also rise by 1.2pp.

US dollar to appreciate, CNY to depreciate, and equity markets will be negatively affected

The tariff shock would also move financial markets. First, the US dollar will likely appreciate, while the RMB will likely depreciate. The appreciation is driven by expectations that increased price levels would go up, prompting the Fed to raise the policy rate. Empirical

studies have found that tariff news led to a stronger US dollar and weaker RMB during the 2018 trade war. Lower growth prospects as a result of higher tariffs would also dampen equities.

US retail industry and agriculture would lose out

In terms of sectoral impact, US companies that rely on Chinese imports such as the electronics and retail industry would lose out most. Retaliation from China would hurt US farmers and other exporters (as it already did during 2018 trade war). Currently, top US exports to China are oilseeds and grains, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals and medicines.

An import ban means an acceleration of supply chain lengthening, squeezing firms' profits and adding to consumer prices

A ban on Chinese imports, even if phased in over 4 years, would be costly to US consumers and global firms. Global electronics firms, for example, will have to lengthen their supply chains further to supply these goods to the US from elsewhere. Such supply chain lengthening has already taken place, and will likely accelerate in this case. Longer supply chains would be more costly, squeezing firms' profits and adding to final prices. Mexico and other Asian countries will likely benefit from more FDI.

A universal 10% tariff would depress global growth but could increase FDI in the US

A universal 10% tariff is more likely to be implemented, in our view. The classic impact would still apply: lower imports, exports and investment, higher prices and a dollar appreciation. It could have the intended effect of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US as the tariffs are imposed universally and nearshoring would not be useful in this case. FDI to the US in fact peaked in 2018 (Exhibit 4).

Exhibit 3: China's share in US imports have declined



Source: Macrobond, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Exhibit 4: FDI did not react to 2018/19 tariffs

Source: Macrobond, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Biden's "larger yard" is an ambitious attempt to control data flows and Internet of Things

As we suggested earlier, Biden will likely increase the size of his "yard" for tech controls. The next comprehensive agenda seems to be data security based on ICTS supply chain restrictions (including ICT network, AI models, Internet of Things ecosystems, with the first example of connected vehicles), which will require compliance from partner countries. It would impose higher regulatory costs on affected firms around the world.

Biden's larger yard will not result in an immediate macro impact, but would lower global productivity in the long run

We may not see a clear and immediate impact from Biden's "larger yard." It will likely create a wall between the US (and its partners) and China's AI-related ecosystems. Such a wall will limit potential trade of "connected" products and services in the future. Global flows of information and knowledge that have helped increase total factor productivity will be dampened, hurting long-run growth prospects. Emerging market (EM) economies would be in a difficult situation in this case as they rely on FDI and technology transfers from advanced economies and China, which may no longer be compatible in the future. Countries that are more exposed to China on the trade front may be reluctant to implement Biden's "fence," for fear of being retaliated by China. Unlike under Trump, the rest of the world will effectively have to choose sides to navigate Biden's world.

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US fixed income

Markets price a much higher long-run neutral rate

Alex Rohner
Fixed Income Strategist
alex.rohner@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 32 24

Markets have repriced short-term policy rate expectations this year. But they have also marked up the estimated level of the equilibrium rate of interest sharply, to above 4.5%, as the US economy proved much more resilient to the higher rates than expected. The level of the long-run neutral rate is the most important driver for long-term yields. That said, a negative reaction of risk assets to the higher rates or signs of a more meaningful slowdown in US growth could easily see lower neutral rate expectations again and a sharp fall in bond yields, as happened at the end of last year.

Markets have repriced short-term policy rate expectations since the start of the year ...

The apparent resilience of the US economy to sharply higher interest rates and the fact that US disinflation has hit a bump, has led to a significant mark-up of the Fed Funds trajectory over the next 12 months. While forward markets priced 7 Fed cuts over 12 months at the start of 2024, expectations have dropped to just 60bp worth of easing. It comes therefore as no surprise that the balance of probabilities has clearly shifted. While two thirds of investors still lean in the direction of policy easing, option implied probabilities for unchanged rates until March 2025 have increased to 25%, while the probability for at least one Fed hike over that period has risen to 10%.

Exhibit 1: Market expectations way above the Fed's March dot plot



Source: Bloomberg, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 08.05.2024

Exhibit 2: Neutral rate is the most important driver for long-term rates



Source: Bloomberg, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 08.05.2024

... but they have also repriced the estimated level of the equilibrium rate of interest

Not only have markets changed their view on the Fed Funds trajectory over the short term, but they have also marked up the estimated level of the equilibrium rate of interest. The fact that standard financial conditions indices reflect a substantial easing over the past 12 months, despite a 400bp increase in real interest rates (see here), suggests that sharply higher interest rates present few headwinds to US growth for now. In other words, the long-run neutral rate of interest could be higher than generally assumed. Based on the Fed Funds futures market, pricing for the long-run Fed Funds rate currently sits at over 4.5%, substantially above the Fed's March median dot plot (Exhibit 1).

The level of the estimated long-run neutral rate is the most important driver of long-term bond yields

While short-term policy rate expectations can explain a substantial portion of long-term rate moves during rate hike (rate cut) cycles in particular, the market's estimate of long-run equilibrium rates is by far the most important driver (Exhibit 2). This is not surprising, since a long-term bond yield reflects the average policy rate over its maturity plus a risk premium. But this also implies that a negative reaction of risk assets to the higher rates or signs of a more meaningful slowdown US growth could easily see lower neutral rate expectations again and a sharp fall in bond yields, as happened at the end of last year.

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Euro area small caps

Not much needed to find a bottom

Wolf von Rotberg
Equity Strategist
wolf.vonrotberg@jsafrasarasin.com
+41 58 317 30 20

We see scope for euro area small caps to outperform their large cap peers after two years of underperformance. Cyclical data has turned in favour of small caps and has helped earnings upgrades to turn positive versus large caps for the first time since 2021. As performance has lagged, valuation discounts have risen to record highs. A catalyst for small caps to outperform would be a dovish repricing of euro area rates, which we think is more likely than a renewed sharp pick up in rates in the near term.

US small caps have recently stabilised, euro area small caps underperformed in 2024 ytd

Euro area small caps have suffered in unison with their US peers over the past two years, underperforming large caps by more than 10% since rates started to rise in January 2022 (Exhibit 1). Yet while US small cap performance has stabilised lately, euro area small caps continued to underperform throughout the first quarter of 2024, despite a broad pick-up in the data. After turning more positive on US small caps at the beginning of Q4 last year, we think there are also good reasons now to be more positive on euro area small caps.

Exhibit 1: Small caps have underperformed since 2022

Source: Refinitiv, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Exhibit 2: Recent uptick in cyclical data has failed to boost small caps



Source: Refinitiv, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Exhibit 3: Small-cap earnings revisions above large-cap revisions

Source: Refinitiv, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Exhibit 4: Small caps trading at substantial discount

Source: Refinitiv, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

The cyclical upswing has boosted small cap earnings, with relative valuations falling to all-time lows

What makes us more optimistic is the fact that earnings have not seen the same kind of decoupling from the cyclical data as relative performance has. EPS revisions relative to large caps have turned positive for the first time since 2021, in line with PMI momentum, which has helped to stabilise profitability over past months (Exhibits 3, 4). The valuation

discount to large caps has continued to rise at the same time, with the relative price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratios touching respective all-time lows lately.

Higher rates have been a key headwind for euro are small caps as well, while banks have helped euro area large caps to outperform

The catalyst for outperformance would be a moderation of bond yields, which have not only been a persistent headwind to highly levered small caps, but also boosted European large caps (Exhibit 5). European banks have been the biggest beneficiary of the resurgence in rates over the past two years as their net interest income and net interest margins recovered to levels last seen in 2008 (Exhibit 6). Bank balance sheets are looking healthier than they did at any point since the global financial crisis, with the outlook for a steady and stable long-term income stream supporting the structural case for the sector. Yet short-term performance is likely to shift towards those pockets of the market, which benefit from lower euro area rates, as a more dovish repricing over the coming months is likely in our view.

Exhibit 5: Euro area small caps are also more levered than large caps



Source: Refinitiv, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Exhibit 6: Banks have been massive beneficiaries from higher rates

Source: Refinitiv, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, 07.05.2024

Improving global demand is starting to feed through to European domestic data

What adds to the potential rates support, is an improving domestic cycle in Europe, which small caps are particularly exposed to. The recent upturn in global macro data has predominantly been driven by the US and China, but is starting to feed through to European domestic data, reflected by upside surprises in euro area services PMIs for April and retail sales in March.

Depressed valuations, an improving domestic cycle and a potential dovish rates reversal could help euro area small caps perform

Bottom-line, we believe that severely depressed euro area small-cap valuations are looking appealing, as i) the cyclical data has been supportive for earnings and is starting to have a more positive impact on the domestic cycle in Europe, while ii) rates headwinds are likely to fade, given the prospect of a dovish repricing.

Economic Calendar

Week of 13/05 – 17/05/2024

Country	Time	Item	Date	Unit	Consensus Forecast	Prev.
Monday, 13.05.2024						
US	17:00	NY Fed 1-Yr Inflation Expectations	Apr	%	--	3.00%
Tuesday, 14.05.2024						
UK	08:00	Average Weekly Earnings 3M/YoY	Mar	3m/yoy	--	5.60%
	08:00	Employment Change 3M/3M	Mar	3m/3m	--	-156k
GE	11:00	ZEW Expectations	May	Index	--	43.90
US	12:00	NFIB Small Business Optimism	May	Index	--	88.50
	14:30	PPI Ex Food and Energy MoM	Apr	mom	0.20%	0.20%
	14:30	PPI Ex Food and Energy YoY	Apr	yoy	2.30%	2.40%
Wednesday, 15.05.2024						
EU	11:00	GDP SA QoQ	1Q	qoq	--	0.30%
	11:00	GDP SA YoY	1Q	yoy	--	0.40%
US	14:30	MBA Mortgage Applications	May10	wow	--	--
	14:30	Empire Manufacturing	May	Index	-10.00	-14.30
	14:30	CPI Ex Food and Energy MoM	Apr	mom	0.30%	0.40%
	14:30	CPI Ex Food and Energy YoY	Apr	yoy	3.60%	3.80%
	14:30	Retail Sales Control Group	Apr	mom	0.10%	1.10%
	16:00	NAHB Housing Market Index	May	Index	--	51.00
Thursday, 16.05.2024						
JN	01:50	GDP Annualized SA QoQ	1Q	qoq	-1.60%	0.40%
US	14:30	Initial Jobless Claims	May11	1'000	--	--
	14:30	Building Permits	Apr	1'000	1488k	1458k
	14:30	NY Fed Services Activity	May	Index	--	-0.60
	14:30	Philadelphia Fed Business Outl.	May	Index	7.20	15.50
Friday, 17.05.2024						
US	16:00	Conference Board Leading Index	Apr	mom	-0.30%	-0.20%

Source: Bloomberg, J. Safra Sarasin as of 08.05.2024

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Market Performance

Global Markets in Local Currencies

Government Bonds	Current value	Δ 1W (bp)	Δ YTD (bp)	TR YTD in %
Swiss Eidgenosse 10 year (%)	0.74	-4	4	0.0
German Bund 10 year (%)	2.50	0	47	-2.9
UK Gilt 10 year (%)	4.14	-22	61	-2.9
US Treasury 10 year (%)	4.46	-5	58	-2.6
French OAT - Bund, spread (bp)	49	1	-5	
Italian BTP - Bund, spread (bp)	134	3	-33	

Stock Markets	Level	P/E ratio	1W TR in %	TR YTD in %
SMI - Switzerland	11'602	18.0	3.0	7.0
DAX - Germany	18'687	13.2	4.4	11.6
MSCI Italy	1'095	9.4	1.7	14.0
IBEX - Spain	11'050	10.9	1.8	11.7
DJ Euro Stoxx 50 - Eurozone	5'054	14.1	3.8	13.9
MSCI UK	2'398	12.2	2.6	10.1
S&P 500 - USA	5'214	21.5	3.0	9.8
Nasdaq 100 - USA	18'113	26.8	3.3	7.9
MSCI Emerging Markets	1'064	12.9	1.1	4.7

Forex - Crossrates	Level	3M implied volatility	1W in %	YTD in %
USD-CHF	0.91	6.3	0.1	7.7
EUR-CHF	0.98	5.2	0.3	5.2
GBP-CHF	1.13	5.9	-0.1	5.9
EUR-USD	1.08	5.7	0.1	-2.4
GBP-USD	1.25	6.6	-0.2	-1.7
USD-JPY	155.6	9.3	1.7	10.4
EUR-GBP	0.86	4.0	0.3	-0.7
EUR-SEK	11.71	6.4	0.6	5.1
EUR-NOK	11.70	7.1	0.0	4.2

Commodities	Level	3M realised volatility	1W in %	YTD in %
Bloomberg Commodity Index	103	10.1	2.5	4.5
Brent crude oil - USD / barrel	83	23.9	-0.8	7.3
Gold bullion - USD / Troy ounce	2'356	17.6	2.3	14.2

Source: J. Safra Sarasin, Bloomberg as of 08.05.2024

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